Indeed, practically every declared nuclear weapon state is engaged in a serious modernization of its strategic arsenal. The United States, by contrast, has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy since the end of the Cold War. The results of this neglect are striking, as scholars Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek have detailed in a pair of studies. America's ICBM force is aging rapidly,...]]> Ilan Berman, a noted expert on Iran and Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, has a great piece in today’s Defense News on the Obama administration’s (mis)handling of U.S. nuclear policy.  Berman reminds us that both Russia and China are modernizing their strategic forces while the U.S. weapons complex is eroding:

Indeed, practically every declared nuclear weapon state is engaged in a serious modernization of its strategic arsenal. The United States, by contrast, has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy since the end of the Cold War.

The results of this neglect are striking, as scholars Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek have detailed in a pair of studies. America’s ICBM force is aging rapidly, and the retirement of long-range missiles such as the Minuteman and Peacekeeper in the years ahead will cause a major constriction in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal, with no replacements in sight. Meanwhile, the U.S. bomber fleet has shrunk by nearly two-thirds since 2001.

An aging work force and poor incentives for science and technology education also raise the possibility that the current decline could become irreversible unless major investments are made, and soon.

The White House doesn’t seem overly concerned by this state of affairs. While some in the Obama administration appear to understand the imperative of nuclear force modernization – Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for one, has emerged as a champion of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program currently languishing in Congress – the prevailing official zeitgeist is squarely in favor of arms control and disarmament.

This trend is deeply troubling, as I’ve noted on multiple occasions.  If this situation is not rectified, the ramifications for U.S. national security will be severe.  It will be interesting to see how this policy debate unfolds in the coming months as the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are briefed to Congress and the administration continues to work with Russia to carve out a follow-on to START. 

]]> http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/2010/01/04/ilan-berman-on-u-s-nuclear-superiority/feed/ 0 http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/2009/03/11/the-russian-reset/ http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/2009/03/11/the-russian-reset/#comments Wed, 11 Mar 2009 16:41:30 +0000 Tom Skypek http://www.hopeisnotaforeignpolicy.org/?p=694 Brad Thayer and I were quoted recently in a piece on U.S.-Russian relations published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).  The EIU piece provides a solid overview of the arms control negotiations that will occur throughout this year between Washington and Moscow regarding the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this December.  It certainly looks as though missile defense will be the wedge issue du jour for this upcoming round of negotiations.  As EIU reports, "Russian commentators insist that there will be no new START unless the US puts its plans for a missile shield on ice."  It will be interesting to see how these negotiations unfold. 

President Obama is clearly receptive to a bargain--at least with respect to the missile defense site in Eastern...]]> Brad Thayer and I were quoted recently in a piece on U.S.-Russian relations published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).  The EIU piece provides a solid overview of the arms control negotiations that will occur throughout this year between Washington and Moscow regarding the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this December.  It certainly looks as though missile defense will be the wedge issue du jour for this upcoming round of negotiations.  As EIU reports, “Russian commentators insist that there will be no new START unless the US puts its plans for a missile shield on ice.”  It will be interesting to see how these negotiations unfold. 

President Obama is clearly receptive to a bargain–at least with respect to the missile defense site in Eastern Europe, as he intimated in his recent letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.  If Moscow helped Washington to stall Iran’s nuclear weapons program by enacting a targeted sanctions package, would the U.S. still need a missile defense site in Eastern Europe?  Theoretically, the primary requirement for a missile defense site in Europe is a nuclear-armed Iran with an expanded ballistic missile capability.  So in the absence of a nuclear-armed Iran, what threat is the missile defense site defending against?  I understand that this was a “test” of the new administration and I share the view that China’s senior political leadership was certainly in the loop on this.  Nikolas Gvosdev examined this issue in more detail last week.

Regrettably, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to separate itself from its financial interests long enough to fulfill its end of the bargain.  Think about it.  Right now, what’s more important to the Russian leadership–financial gains and economic growth or “good will” from Washington?  If you’re Medvedev, you’d probably choose the former.

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