Posts Tagged ‘General Stanley McChrystal’

Thursday, November 5th, 2009 at 11:28am

The Best and the Brightest v2.0

Posted by Tom Skypek in Afghanistan, American Foreign Policy
[caption id="" align="alignleft" width="247" caption="President John F. Kennedy and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 1962"][/caption]

David Halberstam’s 1972 book, The Best and the Brightest, chronicles the origins of the Vietnam War in the Kennedy administration and the conduct and escalation of the war during the Johnson administration.  More specifically, it examines how Camelot’s “best and the brightest” got U.S. policy in Southeast Asia so wrong.  After all, how could so many smart and capable individuals make such poor foreign policy decisions? 

Haunted by the specter of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the perception that the Democrat’s were responsible for “losing China” to the communists in 1949, the Kennedy administration drew a line against communism in…

Friday, October 23rd, 2009 at 3:35pm

“Dithering” from the Commander in Chief

Posted by Tom Skypek in Afghanistan, American Foreign Policy

Not only is the The White House dithering in its war-time decision-making, as former Vice President Dick Cheney noted the other evening, but it’s also being downright disingenuous about Afghanistan.  General Stanley McCrystal delivered his recommendation to the White House at the end of August.  He was frank in his assessment of the situation in Afghanistan:  Without additional troops, the U.S. will be unable to achieve its mission objectives in Afghanistan.  A satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan will be out of reach for Washington.   

Clearly, it is important for decision-makers to understand fully each potential course of action.  However, you can do strategy reviews until you’re blue in the face but at some point you need to make a…

Tuesday, October 20th, 2009 at 9:35pm

Half-Measures in Afghanistan

Posted by Tom Skypek in Afghanistan

Stephen Biddle has an outstanding piece in The New Republic today where he cautions against adopting a middle-of-the-road approach to Afghanistan.  Biddle explains: 

None of the usual middle-way proposals are thus likely to be effective as alternatives to reinforcement. Many are potentially important components of an integrated, properly resourced COIN strategy. But to pull pieces out of this integrated context and undertake them as substitutes for major troop deployments is to deny them essential preconditions they need to function. The pieces of orthodox COIN strategy interact: security enables development and governance, development and governance enhance security, governance facilitates counterterrorism, counterterrorism improves security, security enables negotiation and reconciliation. Each is a valuable complement to the others; none is…

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