Hope is Not a Foreign Policy » U.S. Nuclear Policy

China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020

Tom Skypek — Wed, 20 Oct 2010 01:16:01 +0000

As part of my nuclear fellowship with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), I authored a piece on the future of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. This article was recently published by in a collection of essays on nuclear issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). The are some outstanding essays in the collection on a range of important nuclear topics.

My article examines the burgeoning nuclear capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The intent of the article is to draw attention to Chinese investment in its nuclear forces. There is no shortage of literature examining Chinese conventional military modernization efforts; but judging by recent trends, it is quite clear that Beijing is dedicated to developing a modern, credible, and capable nuclear deterrent. In the article, I present four alternative force structures for China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet in the 2020 timeframe.

The abstract for my article, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China’s SSBN Fleet,” is below:

This article addresses three major analytical questions: first, what are four alternative force structures for China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet in 2020? Second, what are the costs and benefits for each alternative future? Third, which force structure is Beijing mostly likely to adopt and why? This article hypothesizes that the future of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent lies not with the much-heralded Type 094 Jin-class boats but with its follow-on, the nascent Type 096 SSBN. Once fully operational, China’s SSBN fleet will enhance China’s strategic strike portfolio and strengthen Beijing’s overall deterrence posture by providing enhanced range, mobility, stealth, survivability, penetration, and lethality.

I’m sure that some analysts will disagree with my assessment, but I think it’s important that U.S. policymakers look seriously at the possibility of a much more nuclear-capable China in the coming decades.

John Kerry’s Misinformed Position on the New START Treaty

Tom Skypek — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 02:16:40 +0000

Yesterday, Senator John F. Kerry wrote an op-ed in response to Mitt Romney’s piece published earlier this week in which the former governor argued against ratifying the New START Treaty. Kerry’s op-ed was not only hyper-partisan but, as The Heritage Foundation’s James Carafano notes, quite inaccurate as well. Kerry’s op-ed was little more than partisan drivel. It lacked any sort of serious analytical rigor. I would expect a better quality of analysis and thought from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Romney on the New START Treaty

Tom Skypek — Wed, 07 Jul 2010 11:36:40 +0000

It’s hard to pick President Obama’s worst foreign policy mistake. As far as I’m concerned, his general conduct of American foreign policy has been subpar and a bit too Carteresque. According to former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney the New START Treaty is a leading candidate for this administration’s worst foreign policy mistake. In an op-ed in yesterday’s WaPo, Romney presented a very clear argument in opposition to the New START Treaty. I agree wholeheartedly with his advice that the treaty, in its current state, should not be ratified by the United States Senate. Romney argues, “He [Obama] acceded to Russia’s No. 1 foreign policy objective, the abandonment of our Europe-based missile defense program, and obtained nothing whatsoever in return.” I have no problem giving something up to receive something in return–that’s how negotiations work. But it’s unclear to me what exactly we are receiving in return.

Entering into treaties is serious business because it reduces our sovereignty. How does this treaty advance the national interest? That is the question I would need answered, if I were voting on this in the Senate. Flowery language about “Global Zero” and nuclear disarmament would not suffice. To use an Obama phrase, let me be clear: I think a productive relationship with the Russian Federation could be a strategic asset in the coming decades, especially with the rise of China now upon us. However, a productive working relationship must be built on mutual trust and respect. This treaty is simply too one-sided to create the foundation for a stronger relationship with Moscow.

For an opposing view, check out Pavel Podvig’s response.

Nuclear Policy in the Bush Administration: Setting the Record Straight

Tom Skypek — Sat, 13 Feb 2010 20:42:34 +0000

Vice President Joe Biden recently wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal outlining the Obama administration’s nuclear policy. In typical Obama administration fashion, he blamed the preceding administration for “the slow but steady decline in support for our nuclear stockpile and infrastructure, and for our highly trained nuclear work force.” His claim of neglect is simply inaccurate. President George W. Bush made several attempts to revitalize the nuclear weapons complex and exercise the highly trained work force. Unfortunately, these efforts were halted by Congress on multiple occasions. Here are just a few examples:

In 2005, Congress discontinued funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
In the FY08 Defense Appropriations Bill, Congress slashed funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program to $15 million.
Congress denied DoD any FY2008 funding for “testing, fabrication or deployment” of a conventional Trident ballistic missile program.

The Obama administration will provide “$7 billion for maintaining our nuclear-weapons stockpile and complex, and for related efforts. This commitment is $600 million more than Congress approved last year. And over the next five years we intend to boost funding for these important activities by more than $5 billion. Even in a time of tough budget decisions, these are investments we must make for our security. We are committed to working with Congress to ensure these budget increases are approved.” It’s funny. When President George W. Bush tried this, he was stonewalled by Democrats in Congress and members of his own party. The nuclear weapons complex does require additional funds. I support the administration’s decision to allocate these funds; the Congress needs to approve the request in its entirety. My colleagues and I have advocated for additional funds, and, more specifically, modernization. It’s ironic that the president who is talking about ridding the world of nuclear weapons is increasing funding for them. Of course, this is simply the reality of governing. Politicians make lofty promises during campaigns–promises that are simply inconsistent with the realities of governing–and, in this case, inconsistent with our national security requirements.

Ilan Berman on U.S. Nuclear Superiority

Tom Skypek — Mon, 04 Jan 2010 22:45:23 +0000

Ilan Berman, a noted expert on Iran and Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, has a great piece in today’s Defense News on the Obama administration’s (mis)handling of U.S. nuclear policy. Berman reminds us that both Russia and China are modernizing their strategic forces while the U.S. weapons complex is eroding:

Indeed, practically every declared nuclear weapon state is engaged in a serious modernization of its strategic arsenal. The United States, by contrast, has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy since the end of the Cold War.

The results of this neglect are striking, as scholars Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek have detailed in a pair of studies. America’s ICBM force is aging rapidly, and the retirement of long-range missiles such as the Minuteman and Peacekeeper in the years ahead will cause a major constriction in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal, with no replacements in sight. Meanwhile, the U.S. bomber fleet has shrunk by nearly two-thirds since 2001.

An aging work force and poor incentives for science and technology education also raise the possibility that the current decline could become irreversible unless major investments are made, and soon.

The White House doesn’t seem overly concerned by this state of affairs. While some in the Obama administration appear to understand the imperative of nuclear force modernization – Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for one, has emerged as a champion of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program currently languishing in Congress – the prevailing official zeitgeist is squarely in favor of arms control and disarmament.

This trend is deeply troubling, as I’ve noted on multiple occasions. If this situation is not rectified, the ramifications for U.S. national security will be severe. It will be interesting to see how this policy debate unfolds in the coming months as the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are briefed to Congress and the administration continues to work with Russia to carve out a follow-on to START.

A Reading List for Nuclear Proliferation

Tom Skypek — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 20:38:16 +0000

Anyone who studies nuclear weapons policy or nuclear proliferation should check out Brad Thayer’s “What to Read on Nuclear Proliferation” at Foreign Affairs. It identifies several must-reads for academics, students, and policymakers in the nuclear weapons business.

Jon Kyl Takes Lead on Nuclear Policy

Tom Skypek — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 23:47:09 +0000

United States Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) made a compelling argument in today’s Wall Street Journal against ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For nearly two decades the United States has relied on technical extrapolations to verify the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. But these technical extrapolations are essentially ”best guesses” based on historical trends and data. As I said in a recent post, “The only way to be certain a weapon is reliable is to test it.” Kyl is right when he argues that the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is dependent on the reliability of our stockpile. As I’ve mentioned previously, as the credibility of our deterrent decreases, friends and allies may be forced to develop their own nuclear deterrents.

Critics argue that failure to ratify the CTBT will hinder Washington’s ability to lead global nonproliferation efforts. Such arguments are unconvincing, however. As Kyl notes, the U.S. has an impressive record when it comes to nonproliferation:

Aside from the fact that countries will act in their best interest whether or not the U.S. “leads” them, no one can legitimately question U.S. commitment on proliferation issues. No nation has worked harder than the U.S. to pressure North Korea and Iran, and there is no evidence that Russia and China would suddenly help us if we ratified the test-ban treaty.

Moreover, unlike other nations, the U.S. has not conducted a nuclear-weapons test since 1992; it has not designed a new warhead since the 1980s or built one since the 1990s. It has reduced its nuclear-weapons stockpile by 75% since the end of the Cold War and 90% since the height of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the U.S. has spent more than $7 billion on the Nunn-Lugar program, which deals with the “loose nukes” threat, and it will spend more than $2 billion on nonproliferation measures such as securing loose nuclear material this year alone. There is again no evidence one more symbolic gesture is going to change anything.

Kyl is absolutely right. It is clear that U.S. behavior is not the primary driver of other state’s decisions to acquire and/or proliferate nuclear weapons. These efforts did nothing to dissuade North Korea or Iran from developing offensive nuclear weapons programs. As I wrote in The Weekly Standard in March 2009:

It remains fashionable in liberal foreign policy circles to argue that Washington’s behavior is the main catalyst for the decision of other states to acquire nuclear weapons. Of course, Washington’s behavior influences other states–but only to a degree. Washington’s decision to reduce the number of its operationally deployed warheads from around 6,000 to approximately 2,000 has done nothing to dissuade Pyongyang or Tehran from operating aggressive nuclear weapons programs.

Jeffrey Lewis at ArmsControlWonk rightly notes the domestic political challenges associated with a resumption of nuclear testing. However, Lewis’s analysis is incomplete because he neglects the broader strategic issue of why we have nuclear weapons, how they are critical to U.S. national security, and the importance of credibility. Not only does our stockpile keep us safe from a state-sponsored nuclear attack, but it also provides us with bargaining advantages in the diplomatic arena (although the Obama administration clearly doesn’t seem to grasp this concept). It is also important to distinguish between a resumption of nuclear testing and maintaining the capabilities required to conduct a nuclear test. Many of the scientists and engineers who possess this specialized knowledge are Baby Boomers and either have retired or will be retiring in the next few years. It is important to make sure younger generations are developing these capabilities in the event an urgent need for testing surfaces.

Dismissing the importance of testing (and the necessity of maintaining the capabilities required to test) is not only weak analysis but it’s bad policy, too. Let’s say we ratify the CTBT. President Obama will certainly get praise from the Davos crowd–and perhaps another Nobel Prize. But will North Korea suddenly see the light? Or Iran? This token gesture will undoubtedly score the U.S. some political points with the Davos crowd, but it’s highly unlikely that ratification of the CTBT will result in any favorable outcomes for the U.S. It’s highly unlikely that ratification of the CTBT would finally convince Moscow and Beijing to support a real sanctions package against Iran.

At the end of the day, how does ceding our right to test advance the U.S. national interest?

Hope is Not A Nuclear Strategy

Tom Skypek — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 15:03:59 +0000

Just nine months after taking office, the Obama administration has already earned a failing grade on matters of nuclear policy. In the span of a single week in September, the Obama administration abandoned long-standing plans to deploy a third missile defense site in Europe and moved to cut drastically the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal to dangerously low levels. The Guardian reported in late September that President Obama has “rejected” the Pentagon’s initial draft of the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, the congressionally-mandated review of the nation’s nuclear strategy. Radical cuts in America’s nuclear arsenal will have serious ramifications for U.S. national security. Such cuts will reduce the credibility of American power, weaken our bargaining position, and give friends and allies new incentives to develop their own nuclear deterrents while emboldening our adversaries. U.S. adversaries are clearly paying attention: just days after it was reported that Mr. Obama rejected the first draft of the review, Iran shocked the international community when it announced that it has a second uranium enrichment plant under construction.

America’s nuclear weapons complex—its warheads, missiles, and personnel—is aging. The systems that currently comprise Washington’s nuclear strike portfolio were all deployed last century, most of them during the Cold War. The Minuteman III ICBM, the land-based leg of the U.S. nuclear strike portfolio, was first deployed in 1970 during the Nixon administration. The Trident II D-5 SLBM, the sea-based leg of the strike portfolio, was first deployed in 1990 during the Bush administration. The Ohio Class SSBN which carries the Trident II missiles was first deployed in 1981 during the Reagan administration. The B-52H bomber was first deployed in 1961 during the Kennedy administration. The most recent system, the B-2 bomber, was deployed in 1997 during the Clinton administration. What is more, the United States has not produced a new nuclear weapon in the two decades since production of the W-88 warhead ceased in 1989.

According to the The Guardian, Mr. Obama wants the military to cut the number of deployed strategic warheads from roughly two-thousand down to several hundred. But Mr. Obama’s plans neglect the issue of modernization and the impact our aging stockpile will have on U.S. national security. Cuts in the nuclear stockpile may indeed be possible but only if a new generation of warheads and delivery systems are developed. Older systems and warheads should be retired and replaced by newer, modernized systems. The United States can reduce the numbers of its warheads and delivery systems while simultaneously modernizing its forces.

The White House also wants the Pentagon to examine how Washington can guarantee the reliability of its nuclear stockpile without testing or producing new warheads. Mr. Obama’s desire to continue to verify the reliability of the stockpile through technical extrapolations has its flaws. The only way to be certain a weapon is reliable is to test it. Moreover, the knowledge required to conduct nuclear tests is also eroding and must be preserved should the need for a resumption of nuclear testing arise. Many of the Baby Boomers who built these weapons during the Cold War are retiring and the transfer of knowledge to younger generations simply is not happening. Mr. Obama’s plan only exacerbates the “brain drain” problem that is already occurring.

Mr. Obama also wants the military to rewrite U.S. nuclear doctrine to obfuscate Washington’s nuclear targeting policy. But the military should not muddy its nuclear targeting policy. A clear targeting policy strengthens America’s deterrent posture and sends an important message to the international community: those countries who choose to cross pre-stated redlines do so at their own peril.

U.S. nuclear strategy should not be crafted in a vacuum. Washington cannot ignore the fact that its nuclear competitors—namely Moscow and Beijing—are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces—not to mention rogues states such as Iran which is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Unilaterally reducing our stockpile is bad policy. Mr. Obama’s goal to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world is laudable but such goals are overly idealistic and become dangerous when acted upon. What Mr. Obama is proposing is a further gutting of the nuclear weapons complex just as countries like North Korea and Iran are ramping up production. This policy is tantamount to a duel where one of the combatants throws down his weapon because he doesn’t like guns—relying upon hope that the other combatant shares his disdain for firearms. Hope is a bad policy when it comes to nuclear strategy.

The Dying Art of Nuclear Strategy

Tom Skypek — Sun, 15 Mar 2009 18:22:53 +0000

The U.S. should consider recalibrating its nuclear force structure by placing a greater emphasis on SLBMs.

Nuclear strategists are a dying breed–so too is the very art of nuclear strategy. This year the Obama administration will conduct a review of existing U.S. nuclear policy. The review will touch on a host of issues, from missile defense and nonproliferation to stockpile management and force posture.

The intellectual giants of the Cold War who helped us define nuclear strategy have either passed on or are largely retired. Legends such as Herman Kahn, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter are just a few examples. Recently, The Hudson Institute and the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center hosted a panel discussion on the Wohlstetters and their contributions to American strategic thought. You can find the link here.

In anticipation of the upcoming review, I wrote an article in The Weekly Standard to examine some of the issues that will be teed up this year as the Obama administration confronts the very important issue of nuclear strategy. Here’s an excerpt:

Almost fifty years ago, the legendary defense strategist Herman Kahn published his classic work on nuclear strategy, On Thermonuclear War (1960), followed just two years later by a popularized rendering entitled Thinking About the Unthinkable (1962). An iconoclast and one of America’s unsung Cold War heroes, Kahn argued throughout his career that it was the responsibility of the United States government to think creatively, honestly, and unemotionally about the prospects of nuclear war. Today, the need for an honest and open debate on the role of nuclear weapons continues, and the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) presents an ideal forum. While competing priorities such as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and a deteriorating economy at home have decreased the attention paid to the issue of nuclear strategy, its importance remains undiminished.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Defense Department has conducted two comprehensive reviews of U.S. nuclear strategy. The first NPR was conducted in 1994 during the Clinton administration and was plagued by infighting between the Pentagon’s civilian and military leadership. The 1994 review failed to result in any major policy shift, leaving Washington’s Cold War nuclear posture largely intact. The second comprehensive review was conducted by the Bush administration throughout 2001 and was submitted to Congress in December of that year. It marked the first real departure from Cold War thinking on nuclear strategy. The 2001 NPR called for significant reductions in the number of deployed warheads as well as a modernized force structure. The Cold War Triad, which consisted solely of offensive strike systems including bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), was supplanted by a New Triad. The New Triad folded the offensive strike systems into one leg and incorporated advanced conventional munitions; passive and active defenses formed the second leg of the New Triad while a responsive defense infrastructure formed the final leg. This new construct codified the value of strategic defenses and the importance of human capital management.

This article is something of a companion piece to an article Brad Thayer and I wrote last fall in The National Interest. The aim of the piece is to facilitate an honest debate on the future of U.S. nuclear forces and their broader role in our national security strategy, which, I argue, should be significant.

The Russian “Reset”

Tom Skypek — Wed, 11 Mar 2009 16:41:30 +0000

Brad Thayer and I were quoted recently in a piece on U.S.-Russian relations published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The EIU piece provides a solid overview of the arms control negotiations that will occur throughout this year between Washington and Moscow regarding the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this December. It certainly looks as though missile defense will be the wedge issue du jour for this upcoming round of negotiations. As EIU reports, “Russian commentators insist that there will be no new START unless the US puts its plans for a missile shield on ice.” It will be interesting to see how these negotiations unfold.

President Obama is clearly receptive to a bargain–at least with respect to the missile defense site in Eastern Europe, as he intimated in his recent letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. If Moscow helped Washington to stall Iran’s nuclear weapons program by enacting a targeted sanctions package, would the U.S. still need a missile defense site in Eastern Europe? Theoretically, the primary requirement for a missile defense site in Europe is a nuclear-armed Iran with an expanded ballistic missile capability. So in the absence of a nuclear-armed Iran, what threat is the missile defense site defending against? I understand that this was a “test” of the new administration and I share the view that China’s senior political leadership was certainly in the loop on this. Nikolas Gvosdev examined this issue in more detail last week.

Regrettably, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to separate itself from its financial interests long enough to fulfill its end of the bargain. Think about it. Right now, what’s more important to the Russian leadership–financial gains and economic growth or “good will” from Washington? If you’re Medvedev, you’d probably choose the former.