Entering into treaties is serious business because it reduces our sovereignty.  How does this treaty advance the national interest?  That is the question I would need answered, if I were voting on this in the Senate.  Flowery language about “Global Zero” and nuclear disarmament would not suffice.  To use an Obama phrase, let me be clear:  I think a productive relationship with the Russian Federation could be a strategic asset in the coming decades, especially with the rise of China now upon us.  However, a productive working relationship must be built on mutual trust and respect.  This treaty is simply too one-sided to create the foundation for a stronger relationship with Moscow.

For an opposing view, check out Pavel Podvig’s response.

Accept a nuclear-armed Iran.  This course of action is obviously not desirable for Washington, as long as the current regime is in power.  Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would alter the regional military balance in a fundamental way.  Iran would stand to become the dominant military power in the Middle East.  A nuclear-armed Iran would enjoy greater bargaining power diplomatically and largely insulate itself from a conventional military strike (in much the same way North Korea has done by credibly demonstrating its nuclear capability).  Iran’s ability to coerce its neighbors and other actors will increase dramatically.  While Iran does not yet possess a long-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States, it working toward building such a capability.  This means that Iran will be able to hold targets in the United States at risk.  This will make the United States susceptible to nuclear blackmail (again, see North Korea, for an example).  The assumption here is that Iran can be deterred from using its weapons–that its fear of massive retaliation by Washington would prevent their use.  Of course, this is a big assumption.

Continue with sanctions. It is highly unlikely that sanctions will prevent Iran from going nuclear.  This latest round of sanctions is the fourth attempt.  The fact of the matter is that Iran sees nuclear power as a “right” and matter of national pride.  The regime will stop at nothing to build an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.  Sanctions will only slow the process.  In the end, sanctions will not work.  As a policymaker, you can’t just stand around while Iran goes nuclear.  Pushing sanctions is a way of delaying the inevitable.

Support an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex. Secretly, this is what every Sunni nation in the Middle East is hoping for.  Saudi Arabia is even prepared to temporarily de-alert its air defense system, in the event of an Isareli strike against Iran.  However, these countries would never admit in a public forum that they support military action against Iran.  There are several challenges associated with a military strike.  In 1981, Israel used air strikes to destroy Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak.  But Iran’s nuclear weapons complex has many more potential targets which are hardened and dispersed.  A “surgical” air strike, if successful, might destroy a couple of the facilities but would not destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons complex outright.  A more robust air campaign could potentially achieve that objective but with significant risks–namely conflict escalation.  Iran will not sit idly by as Israel drops ordnance on its nuclear facilities.  Iran has a capable air defense system that includes advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).  The SAM threat will pose a significant risk to combat aircraft.  Iran could also decide to launch ballistic missile strikes against Israel, or U.S. forces based in the region.  Iran could also fully activate its terrorist network to launch attacks against Israeli and U.S. forces in the region.  This counterattack would carry with it significant escalation risks for Iran, however, and would draw the United States into the conflict.  Iran is also investing in anti-access/area-denial capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, small high-speed coastal combatants,and advanced anti-ship mines, according to Andrew Krepinevich at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.  The big risk with any military action is the risk of escalation.  It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which a limited air strike devolves into a much broader regional conflict.  If Iran decided to escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces in the region, Washington would have no choice but to respond militarily.

Launch a U.S.-led military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex. Again, the risk of conflict escalation is significant.  Jamie Fly and William Kristol argue that this is not the case–that Iran would not seek to escalate the conflict since what the leadership in Tehran ultimately values is power and an attack on U.S. forces would likely result in “regime decapitation.”  While this line of reasoning makes perfect sense, it is a major assumption and the type of assumption that statesmen have gotten wrong on more than one occasion throughout history–and with disastrous consequences.  The United States could deliver a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear program using air strikes.  However, even with perfect intelligence (which just wouldn’t happen), the United States would probably not be able to destroy Iran’s program outright.  Further, if Iran decided to escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces in the region, Washington policymakers would have to respond militarily.  The problem is that the force is already under considerable stress from fighting the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003, respectively.  Fly and Kristol conclude, “Despite our global commitments and our engagement in two ongoing wars, the U.S. military is fully able to carry out such a mission. Indeed, the success of President Bush’s 2007 surge of forces into Iraq and of President Obama’s sending additional resources to Afghanistan means we are on better footing to deal with Iran’s nuclear program than we were a few years ago.”  While there are already U.S. forces in theater that could be re-deployed if necessary, it is unclear to me the scope of the “mission” to which Fly and Kristol are referring:  are they talking about a massive ground campaign?  Surgical air strikes augmented with special operations forces?  Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have placed stress on the force and have impacted the readiness of the U.S. military.  This has to be a major planning consideration for anyone thinking about the use of force.

Facilitate regime change.  If we woke up tomorrow and Iran was a pro-Western, pro-U.S. democracy, that would problem resolve this standoff.  At that point, we probably wouldn’t care if they had civilian nuclear power program  because we’d trust them to submit to a rigorous inspection regime.  However, it doesn’t look like an organic, domestic revolution will occur in the near-term, despite calls by some senior policymakers to provide substantive support to the Iranian resistance–a course of action the Obama administration declined to adopt during last year’s unrest.  Further, the costs associated with facilitating a regime change through military force are unacceptably high and such an operation shouldn’t even be considered because, quite simply, that is not the role of the United States military.

Not one of these options offers a low-risk approach for U.S. policymakers.  While sanctions are a low-cost approach in the near-term, they will most likely be ineffective and will ultimately result in a nuclear-armed Iran.   Conversely, while a military operation could halt the program for a period of time, the risks of escalation are considerable–even for a “surgical” air strike.  If I had to wager, I would bet that the Obama administration will continue with the sanctions approach.  However, this approach is, unfortunately, doomed to fail.  It may very well be that Iran goes nuclear under President Barack Obama’s watch.

The Commission’s January 2010 report card covers a lot of material in its eighteen pages.  What struck me the most were the three areas in which the Commission gave failing grades: 1) consequence management efforts related to a biological terrorist attack, 2) congressional oversight of the U.S. national security community, and 3) the national security workforce.  I was struck because not one of these three issues is new.  These issues have been documented in countless think tank reports, government-funded studies, and blue ribbon commissions, just like the one that issued this latest report.  The problem(s) have been identified–on several occasions.  The real question is:  will the government take the necessary actions to ensure that the risks in these three areas is reduced?