Hope is Not a Foreign Policy » Iran

Five Options for Dealing with Iran

Tom Skypek — Mon, 14 Jun 2010 13:19:03 +0000

It appears to be just a matter of time before Iran possesses an operational nuclear weapons capability. While the United Nations Security Council recently passed its fourth round of sanctions against Iran, if history is any guide, it is unlikely that this sanctions package will be any more effective than the previous three. Each of these sanctions packages have failed to achieve their stated objective of stopping Iran’s production of nuclear fuel. The options for stopping Iran are dwindling–as is time. There are, in fact, no attractive options for U.S. policymakers. These include: (1) accept a nuclear-armed Iran, (2) continue with sanctions, (3) support an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex, (4) launch a U.S.-led military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex, and (5) facilitate regime change. As I said, not one of these options is attractive. In every case, the risks outweigh the benefits. Liberals believe that, in the end, diplomacy will work. Some conservatives believe that only military force will stop Iran, and while they are probably correct, the costs and risks associated with military action are extraordinarily high.

Accept a nuclear-armed Iran. This course of action is obviously not desirable for Washington, as long as the current regime is in power. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon would alter the regional military balance in a fundamental way. Iran would stand to become the dominant military power in the Middle East. A nuclear-armed Iran would enjoy greater bargaining power diplomatically and largely insulate itself from a conventional military strike (in much the same way North Korea has done by credibly demonstrating its nuclear capability). Iran’s ability to coerce its neighbors and other actors will increase dramatically. While Iran does not yet possess a long-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States, it working toward building such a capability. This means that Iran will be able to hold targets in the United States at risk. This will make the United States susceptible to nuclear blackmail (again, see North Korea, for an example). The assumption here is that Iran can be deterred from using its weapons–that its fear of massive retaliation by Washington would prevent their use. Of course, this is a big assumption.

Continue with sanctions. It is highly unlikely that sanctions will prevent Iran from going nuclear. This latest round of sanctions is the fourth attempt. The fact of the matter is that Iran sees nuclear power as a “right” and matter of national pride. The regime will stop at nothing to build an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. Sanctions will only slow the process. In the end, sanctions will not work. As a policymaker, you can’t just stand around while Iran goes nuclear. Pushing sanctions is a way of delaying the inevitable.

Support an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex. Secretly, this is what every Sunni nation in the Middle East is hoping for. Saudi Arabia is even prepared to temporarily de-alert its air defense system, in the event of an Isareli strike against Iran. However, these countries would never admit in a public forum that they support military action against Iran. There are several challenges associated with a military strike. In 1981, Israel used air strikes to destroy Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak. But Iran’s nuclear weapons complex has many more potential targets which are hardened and dispersed. A “surgical” air strike, if successful, might destroy a couple of the facilities but would not destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons complex outright. A more robust air campaign could potentially achieve that objective but with significant risks–namely conflict escalation. Iran will not sit idly by as Israel drops ordnance on its nuclear facilities. Iran has a capable air defense system that includes advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The SAM threat will pose a significant risk to combat aircraft. Iran could also decide to launch ballistic missile strikes against Israel, or U.S. forces based in the region. Iran could also fully activate its terrorist network to launch attacks against Israeli and U.S. forces in the region. This counterattack would carry with it significant escalation risks for Iran, however, and would draw the United States into the conflict. Iran is also investing in anti-access/area-denial capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, small high-speed coastal combatants,and advanced anti-ship mines, according to Andrew Krepinevich at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. The big risk with any military action is the risk of escalation. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which a limited air strike devolves into a much broader regional conflict. If Iran decided to escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces in the region, Washington would have no choice but to respond militarily.

Launch a U.S.-led military strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons complex. Again, the risk of conflict escalation is significant. Jamie Fly and William Kristol argue that this is not the case–that Iran would not seek to escalate the conflict since what the leadership in Tehran ultimately values is power and an attack on U.S. forces would likely result in “regime decapitation.” While this line of reasoning makes perfect sense, it is a major assumption and the type of assumption that statesmen have gotten wrong on more than one occasion throughout history–and with disastrous consequences. The United States could deliver a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear program using air strikes. However, even with perfect intelligence (which just wouldn’t happen), the United States would probably not be able to destroy Iran’s program outright. Further, if Iran decided to escalate the conflict by attacking U.S. forces in the region, Washington policymakers would have to respond militarily. The problem is that the force is already under considerable stress from fighting the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003, respectively. Fly and Kristol conclude, “Despite our global commitments and our engagement in two ongoing wars, the U.S. military is fully able to carry out such a mission. Indeed, the success of President Bush’s 2007 surge of forces into Iraq and of President Obama’s sending additional resources to Afghanistan means we are on better footing to deal with Iran’s nuclear program than we were a few years ago.” While there are already U.S. forces in theater that could be re-deployed if necessary, it is unclear to me the scope of the “mission” to which Fly and Kristol are referring: are they talking about a massive ground campaign? Surgical air strikes augmented with special operations forces? Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have placed stress on the force and have impacted the readiness of the U.S. military. This has to be a major planning consideration for anyone thinking about the use of force.

Facilitate regime change. If we woke up tomorrow and Iran was a pro-Western, pro-U.S. democracy, that would problem resolve this standoff. At that point, we probably wouldn’t care if they had civilian nuclear power program because we’d trust them to submit to a rigorous inspection regime. However, it doesn’t look like an organic, domestic revolution will occur in the near-term, despite calls by some senior policymakers to provide substantive support to the Iranian resistance–a course of action the Obama administration declined to adopt during last year’s unrest. Further, the costs associated with facilitating a regime change through military force are unacceptably high and such an operation shouldn’t even be considered because, quite simply, that is not the role of the United States military.

Not one of these options offers a low-risk approach for U.S. policymakers. While sanctions are a low-cost approach in the near-term, they will most likely be ineffective and will ultimately result in a nuclear-armed Iran. Conversely, while a military operation could halt the program for a period of time, the risks of escalation are considerable–even for a “surgical” air strike. If I had to wager, I would bet that the Obama administration will continue with the sanctions approach. However, this approach is, unfortunately, doomed to fail. It may very well be that Iran goes nuclear under President Barack Obama’s watch.

Strange Bedfellows: Saudi Arabia and Israel

Tom Skypek — Sat, 12 Jun 2010 23:35:54 +0000

Further evidence that international politics makes strange bedfellows. From The Times:

Saudi Arabia has conducted tests to stand down its air defences to enable Israeli jets to make a bombing raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities, The Times can reveal.

In the week that the UN Security Council imposed a new round of sanctions on Tehran, defence sources in the Gulf say that Riyadh has agreed to allow Israel to use a narrow corridor of its airspace in the north of the country to shorten the distance for a bombing run on Iran.

To ensure the Israeli bombers pass unmolested, Riyadh has carried out tests to make certain its own jets are not scrambled and missile defence systems not activated. Once the Israelis are through, the kingdom’s air defences will return to full alert.

It is truly amazing how the need for security can make bitter rivals cooperate, even in certain rare instances. It really is extraordinary when you consider it–Saudi Arabia and Israel–cooperating.

Iranian Official: Iran Could Escort Convoys

Tom Skypek — Mon, 07 Jun 2010 12:52:51 +0000

You can always count on the regime in Tehran to fan the flames. According to the Guardian, “Iran has warned that it could send Revolutionary Guard naval units to escort humanitarian aid convoys seeking to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza–a move that would certainly be challenged by Israel.” This would obviously add insult to injury and create significant escalation concerns. Unfortunately, it’s not to difficult to imagine a number of potential conflict scenarios in the Middle East where a skirmish quickly devolves into a high-intensity, regional conflict.

How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security

Tom Skypek — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 12:28:32 +0000

Since January 20, 2009, American credibility has taken a back seat to the Obama administration’s quest for international popularity. During his trips to the Middle East and Asia last year, President Obama seemed more interested in bolstering his approval ratings abroad than advancing American interests. Last week it was reported that the Obama administration downgraded the priority placed on intelligence collection for China in an effort to increase cooperation with Beijing. This move was made despite the fact that Chinese cyberattacks against the U.S. are on the rise and the leadership in Beijing remains reticent about its massive military modernization program.

Unfortunately, U.S. national security is more dependent on the credibility of American power—and the words and policies of its commander-in-chief—than international popularity. In foreign affairs, credibility matters. Hollow threats and naïve policies embolden our adversaries while broken commitments lead our friends and allies to question our resolve. During the first year in power, the Obama administration has damaged American credibility with its mishandling of American national security policy.

Ft. Hood Terrorist Attack and Northwest Flight 253. The President’s sluggish response to both incidents was unfortunate, but what was far worse was his failure to identify both attacks for what they were—part of an international campaign by Islamic extremists to kill Americans. After Army Major Nadal Hassan murdered 13 soldiers at Ft. Hood last November, President Obama cautioned against a rush to judgment—despite immediate and overwhelming evidence that Hassan was indeed a jihadist. Obama would later refer to the Nigerian man who attempted to blow up Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day as “an isolated extremist.” This message of obfuscation is not one of strength and only serves to weaken American credibility. If we’re too timid to identify our adversaries, then how can we effectively prosecute a war against them?

The Afghanistan Decision. It took President Obama three months to make a decision on whether or not to increase troop levels in Afghanistan after his commanding general in Afghanistan (whom he selected) appealed to him for additional troops or risk a mission failure. Obviously, it is incumbent upon a commander-in-chief to carefully weigh all of his options when the use of force and American lives are at stake. But dawdling for three months after the commanding general has communicated, in no uncertain terms, that a failure to provide additional troops may jeopardize the mission is unacceptable. Such dithering only serves to paint the picture of an indecisive commander-in-chief. Indecision hampers American credibility.

Nuclear Weapons and a START Follow-On. The dramatic reduction of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and the movement toward a nuclear-free world quickly became one of President Obama’s signature foreign policy issues. In a speech in April 2009, he pledged to reduce significantly the U.S. nuclear stockpile as a first step toward a nuclear-free world. The problem is that his lofty policy ideas are simply incompatible with the U.S.’s need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. While the United States nuclear weapons complex is deteriorating in every respect, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are investing heavily in their own nuclear weapons complexes. Without credibility, deterrence will fail.

Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Warsaw and Prague learned the hard way that under the Obama administration sometimes adversaries are treated better than allies. President Obama’s decision to scrap a missile defense agreement negotiated by his predecessor with the Polish and the Czech governments was yet another credibility-busting policy maneuver. Both Poland and the Czech Republic bent over backwards to support Washington; both countries wanted the European missile defense sites to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles. The message to U.S. allies: Don’t count on the United States to keep its word.

The Iranian Nuclear Program. President Barack Obama’s December 31^st deadline for Iran to accept the terms of the UN-crafted deal over its nuclear program has come and gone, without any real consequences for the regime in Tehran. After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly mocked the year-end deadline, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs warned on December 22^nd that Washington’s ultimatum was “a very real deadline.” This latest deadline should not be confused with the very similar deadline President Obama set in July of last year that called for Iran to show “good faith” efforts toward disarmament by September 2009. The Iranians have faced no substantive consequences for failing to comply with these deadlines. The real consequence of these hollow threats? A deterioration of American credibility.

Closing Gitmo and the Prosecution of CIA Operatives. Days after taking office, President Obama made clear his commitment to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. In August 2009, President Obama tasked Attorney General Eric Holder with investigating CIA operatives who used enhanced interrogation techniques during the Bush administration. Of course, both policy reversals were meant to assuage international opinion about perceived American “excesses” in the fight against Islamic extremism under the administration of George W. Bush. The message to the rest of the world: this is not the Bush administration. While this message might have pleased the Davos crowd and certain constituencies within the United States, this made clear that the Obama administration viewed the struggle against Islamic extremism much differently than its predecessor.

Trying Terrorists in Civilian Courts. The administration’s decision to try terrorists in civilian courts may placate the American Civil Liberties Union but at a tremendous cost to U.S. national security. As Charles Krauthammer recently noted, individuals who do not wear the uniform of a nation-state and launch direct attacks on civilians are enemy combatants and should not be afforded the same rights as American citizens. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the prosecutions of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspirators created a false impression that the U.S. criminal justice system was the proper venue in which to deal with terrorists.[i]

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they’ve been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It’s not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

[i]The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 72.

Tim Marshall on Iran

Tom Skypek — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 14:23:56 +0000

Doesn’t it feel like we’ve been through this Kabuki dance before with the North Koreans? Long, drawn out negotiations that eventually fail to achieve their objective. In order to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the world of diplomacy, you need an honest bargaining partner. It turns out that North Korea was not an honest partner. Does anyone really think that Iran is an honest bargaining partner? If I’m the leadership in Tehran, I’m going to string along the international community, giving the appearance that I’m interested in making a deal–as I rigorously pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Here’s a good report from Tim Marshall of Sky News:

Tehran knows that Washington has no solid policy options. Let’s look at a few of the options:

Sanctions. It’s pretty clear that the Russians and the Chinese will not support a real sanctions package that would actually compel the Iranian leadership to abandon their nuclear program.

Use of Force. This is not an attractive option for a variety of reasons including: the risks of conflict escalation, U.S. resource shortages, and a lack of actionable intelligence on targets.

Accept a Nuclear Iran. The International Community will continue to pretend to halt what might simply be an inevitability. A nuclear Iran would not be good for anyone except Iran. It would alter, in a major way, the regional balance of power in the Middle East. It may lead other Middle Eastern states to develop their own nuclear weapons capability in order to balance against Tehran. The real kicker: once Iran develops a long-range missile capability it will be able to hold targets in the United States at risk. This will have serious implications for U.S. bargaining power.

I thought President Obama was going to meet with these leaders and talk some sense into them. Remember that promise? If there was ever a time for Obama to use his powers of persuasion, now is the time. Again, it looks as though the brutal realities of governing have trumped Obama’s Utopian campaign promises.

United Against Nuclear Iran

Tom Skypek — Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:47:36 +0000

Check out this new organization which was launched just this week. Be sure to sign the petition. A nuclear-armed Iran is not in the interest of the United States.

“Tiny”

Tom Skypek — Wed, 27 Aug 2008 23:09:42 +0000

Another reminder of just how problematic an Obama presidency would be.

Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy “Experience”

Tom Skypek — Mon, 25 Aug 2008 22:07:30 +0000

Experience isn’t always a good thing, especially if your “experience” consists mostly of a string of poor decisions and misjudgments. As Amir Taheri notes in today’s New York Post, Sen. Joe Biden’s foreign policy experience is not something he should be bragging about. In fact, Sen. Biden has been wrong on almost every major national security issue that he’s weighed in on during his nearly four decades in the United States Senate. Taheri explains:

* In 1979, he shared Carter’s starry-eyed belief that the fall of the shah in Iran and the advent of the ayatollahs represented progress for human rights. Throughout the hostage crisis, as US diplomats were daily paraded blindfolded in front of television cameras and threatened with execution, he opposed strong action against the terrorist mullahs and preached dialogue.

* Throughout the 1980s. Biden opposed President Ronald Reagan’s proactive policy against the Soviet Union. Biden was all for détente – which, in practice, meant Western subsidies that would have enabled the moribund USSR to cling to life and continue doing mischief.

* In 1990, Biden found it difficult to support President George Bush’s decision to use force to kick Saddam Hussein’s army of occupation out of Kuwait.

* A decade-plus later, the senator did vote for the liberation of Iraq from Saddamite tyranny. But as soon as terrorists started challenging the new democratic system in Iraq, he switched sides and became a critic of the whole war effort. He claimed that the Iraq war was lost and suggested that the US partition the newly liberated country into three or more mini-states.

There is no more stinging indictment in defense circles than to be compared to President Jimmy Carter. According to Taheri, “By choosing Biden, Obama, the candidate of hope, has transformed his promise of change, into a back-to-the-future pirouette – back to Jimmy Carter.” It’s a good point. Can we really afford Sens. Obama and Biden in the White House and Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid on the Hill?

The Politico-Military Objectives of the Georgian and Russian Leadership

Reggie Gibbs — Sat, 09 Aug 2008 23:29:52 +0000

I wrote to some of you yesterday about what I thought the objectives were for both sides of this conflict. I still think these hold pretty much true. Just to rehash:

Russia: Toss the Georgians out of South Ossetia, and embarrass them enough so that they (the Russians) maintain de facto control over South Ossetia, while leveraging their position in Abkhazia and throughout the southern Caucasus region in general

Georgia: Bloody the Russians bad enough, or make the case that they (the Russians) have committed a.) multiple human rights violations and/or war crimes and b.) overreached in their operations, that the international community will get involved and apply pressure to put a truly international and neutral peacekeeping force in South Ossetia. If the Georgians can accomplish this, it will only be a matter of time (years though) before South Ossetia is incorporated back into Georgia.

As for the United States and Europe, the most the they can do right now is put pressure on Russia to stop. This won’t matter as long Russia feels they have the upper hand. They’ll keep going until the Georgians are out of South Ossetia. But, if the Russians start suffering a losses, they’ll start suing for peace. Regardless, this will continue to get bloodier before it gets better.

Georgian soldiers near a bombed building in Gori on Saturday. Courtesy: Gleb Garanich/Reuters

A few updates and my thoughts on them:

The Russian government is reporting they have won back control of South Ossetia’s capital, Tskhinvali. The Georgians are denying this, but I think the Russians are probably telling the truth in this instance, although its murky. Eyewitness reports have said to have seen no Georgian troops in Tskinvali since this morning. However, Russia Today is also reporting that suburbs in Tskhinvali are still being shelled by Georgian artillery units. Hence, the Russians are trying to paint the picture that the Georgians are in full retreat. I don’t believe this is the case. What it sounds like to me right now is that the Russians continue to have the upper-hand because the Georgians underestimated the amount of troops, tanks, and general military might the Russians had waiting in North Ossetia in the event of war. However, as I said yesterday, the Georgians are no slouches. My guess is they’re still off-balance, but are attempting to regroup and we may see a pretty powerful counterattack in the next 24 hours.

Regarding the Russians throwing a lot at this, this is just one more point to bolster the argument that the Russians were the true provocateurs in all of this. As Ralph Peters says in his piece today in the New York Post (I’ll link it below), if the Russians hadn’t been aiming for a fight, there is no way they would have had this many troops and equipment ready to go- at least not this much equipment that actually worked, or troops of sufficient caliber to operate like they are. The Russian military, plain and simple, is just not this good on this short a notice. The Georgians may have “invaded” so-to-speak, but they didn’t, from my perspective, do it without sufficient cause.

Russia Today reports Abkhazian rebels have attacked Georgian units in the Kodori Gorge. If this true, this is really bad, and could mean this conflict is spreading throughout Georgia pretty quickly.

Georgia has pulled its 2,000 troops out of Iraq. What this means for us, and what it means for Georgia:

For US: Difficulties in the short-term, not too much to worry about in the long run. We’ll have to shift some units from elsewhere, perhaps, and they’re tours may get extended by a few months. However, I think this is another opportunity for the Iraqi Army to step up to the plate and show the world once again how far they have come
For the Georgians: Could mean a couple of things. First, they believe they’re in this fight for a long while and will actually need the additional combat-ready forces soon. Second, Georgia declared martial law last night, so they’ll need the additional troops to enforce that. Third, as noted above, Abkhazia may be flaring back up. Bottom line, the troops they have in Iraq are good and they need them pretty quickly to deal with any number of issues. I hope we’ll see them back in Iraq, but it’s doubtful we will.
Putin left Beijing and is now in North Ossetia to ostensibly care for Ossetian refugees. Whatever. However, nothing too unusual about this I think. The only nugget that I may suggest is that there may be angst in the Kremlin that this could sour pretty fast for the Russians? Just a thought. Medvedev is still in Moscow.

For our Presidential Candidates and their responses, McCain’s was right now, Obama’s less than impressive demonstrating once again who will play hardball with aggressors and who will sit down, hold hands, and talk about feelings. McCain has made strong statements regarding Russia in the past and is under no illusion what the nature of the government is in the Kremlin right now. Obama has no clue where the Kremlin is.

Here are some good pieces on the conflict that came out this morning.

Ralph Peters agrees with my assessment from yesterday that the Russians, if this thing goes on, will find out just how good the Georgian military is.
Anne Applebaum, whom I have a lot of respect for, takes a somewhat different view stating clearly she thinks the Georgians are in over their head.
In addition to the US news sites and the BBC, I would also recommend keeping an eye on Russia Today; it’s been criticized as being the “mouthpiece of the Kremlin.” It certainly is pro-Russian, but they do some decent reporting also that is factually correct, though at times obviously spun.

The Iran Problem

Tom Skypek — Fri, 11 Jul 2008 09:15:53 +0000

Dealing with Iran will be a major foreign policy challenge for the next administration. And as Sen. Clinton stated repeatedly throughout the Democratic primary, the United States needs a president who can lead on day one. Iran’s latest series of missile tests only reaffirms the need for the United States to emplace missile interceptors in Europe. The successful shoot down of a falling satellite earlier this year by the Department of Defense validated the missile defense system, which is still wrongfully derided by critics.

It is unclear what the Iranian leadership believes it gains by conducting these provocative tests and continuing to propagate belligerent rhetoric. It is probably an effort to bolster its deterrence posture. Unfortunately, Iran only increases the risk of miscommunication and thus increases the risk of conflict. Iran test fired a new iteration of its long-range missile, the Shahab-3. It is believed to have a range of 1,250 miles and is capable of carrying a one-ton conventional warhead. Sen. McCain understands the threat Iran poses to U.S. interests and unlike Sen. Obama, he has a plan to contain Tehran. Yesterday, Sen. McCain issued a statement:

Iran’s most recent missile tests demonstrate again the dangers it poses to its neighbors and to the wider region, especially Israel. Ballistic missile testing coupled with Iran’s continued refusal to cease its nuclear activities should unite the international community in efforts to counter Iran’s dangerous ambitions. Iran’s missile tests also demonstrate the need for effective missile defense now and in the future, and this includes missile defense in Europe as is planned with the Czech Republic and Poland. Working with our European and regional allies is the best way to meet the threat posed by Iran, not unilateral concessions that undermine multilateral diplomacy.

Sen. Obama, on the other hand, urged “diplomacy.” Certainly diplomacy has its place, but years of multilateral engagement with our European partners have failed to change Tehran’s behavior, so why would Sen. Obama think more diplomacy would work when he’s president? To think that bilateral engagement is appropriate in this situation is naïve and dangerous. Meeting directly with the Iranian leadership will only provide them with undeserved legitimacy. Sen. Obama has issued several confused statements regarding Cold War diplomacy, wrongly conflating the diplomatic efforts of two very different eras. “Iran, Cuba, Venezuela–these countries are tiny compared to the Soviet Union. They don’t pose a serious threat to us the way the Soviet Union posed a threat to us. And yet we were willing to talk to the Soviet Union at the time when they were saying, ‘We’re going to wipe you off the planet.” These are words you’d expect from an undergraduate writing a term paper for an International Relations course, not of a serious presidential candidate.

The threat from Iran’s nuclear program is real and it is grave. As president, I will do everything in my power to eliminate that threat, and that must begin with direct, aggressive, and sustained diplomacy.

What’s most concerning is that Sen. Obama hasn’t held a consistent position on Iran. One month he argues that the threat from Iran is exaggerated and then two months later he characterizes the threat as “real” and “grave.” Let us not forget that Iran has supplied materiel to insurrgents in Iraq which has resulted in the deaths of American servicemen. Iran poses a problem on several fronts. The next president must be prepared to deal with th Iran problem on January 20, 2009.