Hope is Not a Foreign Policy » China

China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020

Tom Skypek — Wed, 20 Oct 2010 01:16:01 +0000

As part of my nuclear fellowship with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), I authored a piece on the future of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. This article was recently published by in a collection of essays on nuclear issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2010 Nuclear Scholars Initiative (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010). The are some outstanding essays in the collection on a range of important nuclear topics.

My article examines the burgeoning nuclear capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The intent of the article is to draw attention to Chinese investment in its nuclear forces. There is no shortage of literature examining Chinese conventional military modernization efforts; but judging by recent trends, it is quite clear that Beijing is dedicated to developing a modern, credible, and capable nuclear deterrent. In the article, I present four alternative force structures for China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet in the 2020 timeframe.

The abstract for my article, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China’s SSBN Fleet,” is below:

This article addresses three major analytical questions: first, what are four alternative force structures for China’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet in 2020? Second, what are the costs and benefits for each alternative future? Third, which force structure is Beijing mostly likely to adopt and why? This article hypothesizes that the future of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent lies not with the much-heralded Type 094 Jin-class boats but with its follow-on, the nascent Type 096 SSBN. Once fully operational, China’s SSBN fleet will enhance China’s strategic strike portfolio and strengthen Beijing’s overall deterrence posture by providing enhanced range, mobility, stealth, survivability, penetration, and lethality.

I’m sure that some analysts will disagree with my assessment, but I think it’s important that U.S. policymakers look seriously at the possibility of a much more nuclear-capable China in the coming decades.

Ilan Berman on U.S. Nuclear Superiority

Tom Skypek — Mon, 04 Jan 2010 22:45:23 +0000

Ilan Berman, a noted expert on Iran and Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, has a great piece in today’s Defense News on the Obama administration’s (mis)handling of U.S. nuclear policy. Berman reminds us that both Russia and China are modernizing their strategic forces while the U.S. weapons complex is eroding:

Indeed, practically every declared nuclear weapon state is engaged in a serious modernization of its strategic arsenal. The United States, by contrast, has allowed its strategic infrastructure to atrophy since the end of the Cold War.

The results of this neglect are striking, as scholars Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek have detailed in a pair of studies. America’s ICBM force is aging rapidly, and the retirement of long-range missiles such as the Minuteman and Peacekeeper in the years ahead will cause a major constriction in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal, with no replacements in sight. Meanwhile, the U.S. bomber fleet has shrunk by nearly two-thirds since 2001.

An aging work force and poor incentives for science and technology education also raise the possibility that the current decline could become irreversible unless major investments are made, and soon.

The White House doesn’t seem overly concerned by this state of affairs. While some in the Obama administration appear to understand the imperative of nuclear force modernization – Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for one, has emerged as a champion of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program currently languishing in Congress – the prevailing official zeitgeist is squarely in favor of arms control and disarmament.

This trend is deeply troubling, as I’ve noted on multiple occasions. If this situation is not rectified, the ramifications for U.S. national security will be severe. It will be interesting to see how this policy debate unfolds in the coming months as the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are briefed to Congress and the administration continues to work with Russia to carve out a follow-on to START.

Congress Should Launch All-Star Commission to Examine Cyber Threats

Tom Skypek — Tue, 17 Nov 2009 23:43:43 +0000

A report issued last month by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded: ”China is likely using its maturing computer network exploitation capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S. Government and industry by conducting a long term, sophisticated, computer network exploitation campaign.” For the last decade, China has been conducting ”hacker attacks” and network intrusions against U.S. Government and private sector computer networks. In June 2008, Congressman Frank Wolf (VA-10th) revealed that computers in his office had been hacked; authorities concluded that the attacks originated in China. Last May, I argued in The Washington Times that our lack of a declaratory cyber deterrence policy makes us weaker as a nation by enabling our adversaries in cyberspace to operate in what amounts to a consequence-free environment.

Congress should launch a new independent commission to examine the threat posed by offensive cyber capabilities. But this commission should not be comprised of only career national security professionals. Rather, it should include innovative thinkers in private industry. We need creative thinkers to look at this challenge with fresh eyes, unencumbered by Washington’s national security bureaucracy. Cyberspace remains America’s Achilles’ heel. Great steps have been taken to enhance our cybersecurity and head off a “Pearl Harbor” in cyberspace but the threat of a catastrophic, disruptive attack remains.

Candidates for this commission should include an eclectic mix. Here are a few candidates:

Steve Jobs, Founder and CEO, Apple Corporation, Inc.
Sergey Brin, Co-Founder and President, Technology, Google, Inc.
Mitt Romney, Former CEO, Bain & Company
Richard Rumelt, Professor, UCLA Anderson School of Management
Ian Bremmer, President, Eurasia Group

Can you imagine the brainpower these men would bring to bear on this problem? These commissioners should be assisted by a team of staff assistants with expertise in defense, intelligence, information assurance, and law enforcement. Each staff assistant should have 15-20 years of experience in their area of expertise. Each staff assistant should be supported by a cadre of research assistants with 5-10 years of experience in defense, intelligence, information assurance, and law enforcement.

Topics for exploration should include:

Cyber Deterrence
Interagency Resourcing for the Acquisition of Materiel Cyber Capabilities
Human Capitial Elements of Cyber Warfare in the U.S. National Security Community
Offensive Cyber Capabilities
Intelligence Collection on Cyber Threats
Public-Private Sector Coordination
Cyber Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army

The cyber challenge requires “outside of the box” thinking. Each of these prospective commissioners have proven themselves as innovative thinkers, problem solvers, and entrepreneurs. They are an intellectually diverse group and would examine the cyber challenge with a unique perspective. Rather than have the same Washington think tanks and the same Washington analysts look at the problem, we should ask these successful businessmen to leverage their experience to tackle a huge national challenge.

China’s Growing Influence on the African Continent

Tom Skypek — Tue, 14 Oct 2008 22:11:32 +0000

Here’s an excerpt from a piece I authored recently in The Weekly Standard:

The African continent is quickly becoming a proxy battleground for Washington and Beijing, as the latter’s appetite for emerging markets and raw materials grows. In July 2008, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “China’s full court press to establish influence and connections in Africa and Latin America may be seismic in its future implications for the United States.” China’s burgeoning influence in Africa is now squarely on the Pentagon’s radar screen. In October 2007, the United States affirmed its commitment to the continent by announcing the establishment of a new combatant command: Africa Command, known by its acronym in defense circles as AFRICOM. While Washington policymakers deny that Beijing’s behavior is the rationale for its establishment, it appears as though AFRICOM marks the beginning of a new containment strategy aimed at curtailing Chinese power and influence in Africa. Since October 2007, AFRICOM was operating under the auspices of U.S. European Command, but last week, on October 1, AFRICOM officially became the Defense Department’s tenth unified combatant command.

China may pose a number of problems for U.S. policymakers as it becomes more and more involved-both economically and diplomatically-on the continent. From a military perspective, this would significantly complicate U.S. counterterrorism operations, as countries loyal to Beijing place new restrictions on the United States. Additionally, China’s proliferation of small arms and light weapons to hostile state and non-state actors will only make the world more dangerous. Politically, this could give China increased influence in venues like the United Nations Security Council, particularly among the non-permanent members of the Council. Finally, the economic competition between the U.S. and China for the continent’s critical resources may decidedly advantage Beijing.

You can find the article in its entirety here.

Russia Seeks Counterbalance to West from SCO

Matt Schwieger — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 19:42:07 +0000

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev appealed to China and other Central Asian nations to show its support for Russia’s actions in Georgia at a Shangai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tajikistan today. International press offered conflicting analysis, which of course, is no surprise. What is striking, however, is that the break was not along traditional media fault lines. The following is a snapshot of a few of the headlines…

(CNN) — Russia’s hopes of winning international support for its actions in Georgia were dashed Thursday, when China and other Asian nations expressed concern about mounting tensions in the region.

AP: Asian alliance snubs Russian plea for support

AFP: Medvedev hails support from China, Central Asia

Daily Telegraph Australia Moscow: Russia wins backing from China

Sydney Morning Herald Russia wins backing from China, Central Asia over Georgia

Which is it? Support or isolation? Of course Medvedev claims, “I am sure that the united position of the SCO member states will have international resonance…And I hope it will serve as a serious signal to those who try to turn black into white and justify this aggression,” The actual language of the joint declaration from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, however, points to a more subtle message of reserved support for Russia with clear caveats: namely, the respect for “the unity of the state and its territorial integrity.” It is important to note that none of the other SCO member states joined Russia in recognizing the independence claims of Georgia’s separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Certainly, China is treading lightly on its response to the Georgia situation as it deals with its own internal seperatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The next US administration needs to highlight and exploit these subtle but important differences that arise between China and Russia on Georgia, and increase our strategic engagement efforts with NATO Partnership for Peace states in Central Asia.

Russia as a Strategic Partner?

Tom Skypek — Thu, 21 Aug 2008 21:20:24 +0000

The other day Thomas P.M. Barnett asked whether or not Russia could eventually be a strategic partner for United States. He argued that Washington’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Georgia has been overly emotional:

Frankly, putting the political and strategic implications aside for a minute, Russia’s intervention in Georgia should strike us as more of a turn-on than turn-off. In the past, I’ve tended to write Russia off as a strategic partner not because the incentives weren’t there but because the military and governmental capabilities had seemingly atrophied to such a profound degree. Georgia can be seen as disproving that perception.

I mean, if you want strategic allies who can go places and do stuff in a long war against radical extremism, we should be more impressed than dismayed.

But, of course, that requires us to view the situation with less emotion and to think more long term.

Barnett raises an interesting point here. Georgia fought largely with U.S. weapons and many of its forces received military training from the United States (you can read about the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) here). Arguably, Russia’s battlefield performance was impressive, though more analysis will be needed to understand better Moscow’s campaign. As China’s power continues to grow, the U.S. could use a partner to balance against China. Maybe the United States could use Russia to triangulate against China?

Robert Kagan and The Return of History

Tom Skypek — Sun, 17 Aug 2008 12:08:09 +0000

After the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, some defense analysts and international relations scholars believed that a new, peaceful era would emerge. One scholar, Francis Fukuyama, built his career on this idealistic hypothesis (which he now backed away from). He wrote a an article in 1989 entitled “The End of History?” which concluded that liberal democracy had triumphed over authoritarian forms of government. In an article yesterday, Robert Kagan examined the growing power of the authoritarian regimes of Moscow and Beijing and the “return of history”:

One wonders whether Russia’s invasion of Georgia will finally end the dreamy complacency that took hold of the world’s democracies after the close of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union offered for many the tantalizing prospect of a new kind of international order. The fall of the Communist empire and the apparent embrace of democracy by Russia seemed to augur a new era of global convergence. Great power conflict and competition were a thing of the past. Geo-economics had replaced geopolitics. Nations that traded with one another would be bound together by their interdependence and less likely to fight one another. Increasingly commercial societies would be more liberal both at home and abroad. Their citizens would seek prosperity and comfort and abandon the atavistic passions, the struggles for honor and glory, and the tribal hatreds that had produced conflict throughout history. Ideological conflict was also a thing of the past. As Francis Fukuyama famously put it, “At the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.” And if there were an autocracy or two lingering around at the end of history, this was no cause for concern. They, too, would eventually be transformed as their economies modernized.

Unfortunately, the core assumptions of the post-Cold War years have proved mistaken. The absence of great power competition, it turns out, was a brief aberration. Over the course of the 1990s, that competition reemerged as rising powers entered or reentered the field. First China, then India, set off on unprecedented bursts of economic growth, accompanied by incremental but substantial increases in military capacity, both conventional and nuclear. By the beginning of the 21st century, Japan had begun a slow economic recovery and was moving toward a more active international role both diplomatically and militarily. Then came Russia, rebounding from economic calamity to steady growth built on the export of its huge reserves of oil and natural gas.

Nor has the growth of the Chinese and Russian economies produced the political liberalization that was once thought inevitable. Growing national wealth and autocracy have proven compatible, after all. Autocrats learn and adjust. The autocracies of Russia and China have figured out how to permit open economic activity while suppressing political activity. They have seen that people making money will keep their noses out of politics, especially if they know their noses will be cut off. New wealth gives autocracies a greater ability to control information–to monopolize television stations and to keep a grip on Internet traffic, for instance–often with the assistance of foreign corporations eager to do business with them.

In the long run, rising prosperity may well produce political liberalism, but how long is the long run? It may be too long to have any strategic or geopolitical relevance. In the meantime, the new economic power of the autocracies has translated into real, usable geopolitical power on the world stage. In the 1990s the liberal democracies expected that a wealthier Russia would be a more liberal Russia, at home and abroad. But historically the spread of commerce and the acquisition of wealth by nations has not necessarily produced greater global harmony. Often it has only spurred greater global competition. The hope at the end of the Cold War was that nations would pursue economic integration as an alternative to geopolitical competition, that they would seek the “soft” power of commercial engagement and economic growth as an alternative to the “hard” power of military strength or geopolitical confrontation. But nations do not need to choose. There is another paradigm–call it “rich nation, strong army,” the slogan of rising Meiji Japan at the end of the 19th century–in which nations seek economic integration and adaptation of Western institutions not in order to give up the geopolitical struggle but to wage it more successfully. The Chinese have their own phrase for this: “a prosperous country and a strong army.”

The rise of these two great power autocracies is reshaping the international scene. Nationalism, and the nation itself, far from being weakened by globalization, has returned with a vengeance. There are the ethnic nationalisms that continue to bubble up in the Balkans and in the former republics of the Soviet Union. But more significant is the return of great power nationalism. Instead of an imagined new world order, there are new geopolitical fault lines where the ambitions of great powers overlap and conflict and where the seismic events of the future are most likely to erupt.

I agree with Kagan’s assessment. Nationalism has returned. Unfortunately, it is likely to be accompanied by militarism.

“How to Handle China”

Tom Skypek — Sun, 03 Aug 2008 19:53:56 +0000

From Fareed Zakaria’s recent article entitled “How to Handle China”

The greatest failure of Western foreign policy since the cold war ended has been a sin of omission. We have not pursued a foreign policy toward the world’s newly rising powers that aims to create new and enduring relations with them, integrate them into existing structures of power and lay out new rules of the road to secure peace and prosperity. If the emerging countries grow strong outside the old order, they will freelance and be unwilling to help build a new one. The new world might well be the same as the old—the 19th-century world, that is, marked by economic globalization, political nationalism and war.

Zakaria is a talented writer, but I disagree with his assertion that the West has failed to reach out to rising powers, particularly China. Diplomatic engagement is a two-way street, and China has been reluctant to partner with the West. Its campaign to deceive the international community about its defense expenditures is especially problematic.

Moreover, Zakaria’s article fails to deliver what its title promises. He proposes no real solutions for policymakers grappling with how to understand China’s behavior.

China Continues to Modernize its Strategic Forces, Builds New SSBNs, ICBMs

Tom Skypek — Mon, 21 Jul 2008 14:23:03 +0000

According to the most recent Nuclear Notebook published in the July/August issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen examine China’s nuclear forces in 2008. They identify three important developments:

China continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces
China has deployed two new long-range ICBMs, the DF-31 and the DF-31A
China is producing up to four new SSBNs

Beijing’s maritime investments are especially concerning. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are survivable weapons platforms which provide an array of capabilities beyond what is required for China’s domestic security. A robust SSBN fleet will enable China to project power both regionally and globally.

Increased transparency on the part of Beijing would help to allay concerns over its rising defense budget and nuclear modernization efforts. If China is serious about rising peacefully, it should increase transparency. How should an international observer interpret Beijing’s unexplained but growing investment? Beijing’s declared defense outlays are around $60M. The U.S. government puts the actual figure between $100 – $140M. Chinese military strategy is rooted in the art of deception, so it would be imprudent to simply assume that these expenditures are for benign purposes. Recall the words of Sun Tzu in the Art of War: “All warfare is based on deception.”

These two issues-the defense budget and its nuclear modernization efforts-are inextricably linked. It’s a matter of transparency. China is a sovereign state and will develop its forces as its leadership sees fit. But it is disingenuous for Beijing to talk about a peaceful rise as its defense budget continues to swell and they procure systems like SSBNs, which have a singular purpose: power projection. This trend should be watched closely by Washington and its friends. If this trend continues, it could seriously alter the military balance in the region.