Hope is Not a Foreign Policy » Afghanistan

Afghanistan Study Group Report

Tom Skypek — Sat, 05 Mar 2011 14:28:09 +0000

The Afghanistan Study Group issued this report last year. I received a copy at a meeting this week and read it cover-to-cover. It’s a succicnt report yet manages to address the key issues at hand. It certainly challenges the conventional wisdom and outlines a new strategy for what has become America’s longest war.

Conservatives Shouldn’t Fear Cuts to Defense Budget

Tom Skypek — Thu, 17 Feb 2011 23:32:51 +0000

Social Security may be the third rail of American politics, but the defense budget is at least worthy of notable mention. In fact, the defense budget is arguably the most politically sensitive budget item after entitlement spending. Conservatives and Republicans, who have enjoyed an advantage over their liberal counterparts on national security issues since Vietnam, too often associate a “strong national defense” simply with increases in defense spending—without considering the expenditures in the context of broader U.S. grand strategy. Many conservatives and Republicans are reluctant to propose cuts to the defense budget out of fear for appearing weak. Many just lack any strategic sense and simply follow the big government internationalism crowd which includes both liberals and parts of the conservative movement.

Liberals and Democrats are split into two camps: There are those Democrats who remember the Left’s shameful behavior during the Vietnam War and are reluctant to propose cuts out of fear for appearing weak. Then there are liberals and Democrats who can’t cut enough from the defense budget and have lost sight of the important fact that one of the few constitutional responsibilities of the federal government is to provide for the “common defence.”

Then there is a third category which includes liberals and Democrats, conservatives and Republicans: politicians with defense contractors in their states. These politicians are reluctant to cut defense programs even when they’re no longer needed in order to protect jobs in their districts and states. The F-22 is a case in point.

So what did President Obama do with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 defense budget? He did what was politically safe and made no cuts to the baseline budget but slightly reduced funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a liberal Democrat, he is extra sensitive to being perceived as weak and can’t afford the political risks associated with larger cuts to the defense budget; he does want a second term so why stoke the Jimmy Carter comparisons? Justin Fishel writing at FoxNews.com provides a good snapshot of the FY 2010, 2011, and 2012 budgets:

In 2010 there was a base budget of $531 billion, with an additional $130 billion to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, known as OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations) funding. President Bush called it Global War on Terror or GWOT funding, a term dropped by Obama. Later in 2010 President Obama added another $33 billion in supplemental spending to fund the 30,000-man troop surge in Afghanistan.

2010 grand total: $694,000,000,000

The proposal for FY 2011 asked for a $549 billion base, with $159 in OCO spending.

2011 proposed grand total: $708,000,000,000

The FY 2012 defense budget asks for $553 billion in base spending, with $118 billion for the wars. That significant decrease in war spending is directly related to heavy troop withdrawals in Iraq.

2012 proposed grand total: $671,000,000,000

In January Secretary Gates announced a plan to cut $78 billion in defense spending over five years. The largest savings would come from shrinking the size of the Army by 27,000 soldiers and the Marines by 15 – 20,000 in the year 2015. That assumes the war in Afghanistan will be over for the U.S. by the end of 2014.

If you’re going to cut defense spending it makes sense to slash ineffective pet programs, of which the Pentagon has many, rather than funds for ongoing operations in Iraq and, especially, Afghanistan. I don’t agree with our current strategy in Afghanistan, but if we have troops in harm’s way we have a moral obligation to fully fund them. Anyone who has worked in the Pentagon has seen these pet programs and inefficiencies, though Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has made some significant progress in streamling Pentagon operations.

Thinking about the defense budget in a vacuum is strategically unsound but a common practice in Washington. A budget is required to help an organization achieve its objectives; a budget is a means to an end. So this begs the question: what is our grand strategy? Rather than reflexively opposing cuts to the defense budget, conservatives should not cower from reasonable cuts to the defense budget. Any analysis should consider the following four questions:

For what reasons does America engage in foreign affairs?
What are America’s national interests?
What are the threats those interests?
What is America’s grand strategy?

The answers to these questions will determine what kind of military is required to support these ends and how much it will cost. I believe that our current grand strategy is too costly and disconnected from the national interest and Constitution. I recently laid out my vision for a conservative foreign policy in the Washington Examiner in a piece entitled, “It’s time to end big government internationalism.” In it I argued:

Since the end of the Cold War, American statesmen have defined the national interest in far too broad of terms, squandering taxpayer dollars in support of a foreign policy that does not clearly advance America’s core national interests. In FY 2008, Washington provided foreign aid to about 154 countries. Today, the U.S. military has a presence in about 150 countries. The majority of these aid packages and military deployments do little to promote America’s national interests; still, this type of big government internationalism has become unquestioned convention for the Washington foreign policy establishment and conservatives are as guilty as their liberal counterparts in pushing the global welfare state.

Many Republican and Democratic policymakers conflate American diplomatic, economic, and military primacy with omnipotence. As a result, they have consistently failed to reconcile America’s desired end states with its available means—eschewing important economic realities such as the $14 trillion national debt while failing to make the difficult tradeoffs often required of effective statesmen. In order to avoid the fate of previous great powers, the United States should adopt an economically sustainable grand strategy that advances a set of more narrowly defined national interests, encourages burden-sharing among its allies, and is consistent with the Constitution. More specifically, Washington should reduce its global footprint, keep its military power in abeyance, and discharge that power only in defense of the national interest.

The sole aim of Washington’s international engagement should be the preservation of American political and economic liberty—not to remake the world in its image. In his book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, former U.S. Senator Robert Taft argued, “I do not believe it is a selfish goal for us to insist that the overriding purpose of all American foreign policy should be the maintenance of the liberty and peace of our people of the United States…”

So where would I cut? I would do a few things right off the bat. I would redeploy the 50,000 military personnel we currently have in Europe (it costs serious money to train, equip, and sustain forces in a foreign country). Correspondingly, I would scale back our commitments to NATO. NATO is a military alliance without a clear mission. It achieved its Cold War-era objectives, but it is no longer useful in the 21st century; it should be replaced with bilateral or smaller multilateral alliances to increase burden-sharing and reduce the stress on the U.S. force. The alliance’s biggest test in recent years–Afghanistan–has yielded disappointing results. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)–the NATO military organ in charge of operations in Afghanistan–places the vast majority of the burden on the U.S. Some troops have quipped that ISAF really stands for “I saw an American fight.”

I would also adopt a new strategy in Afghanistan, one that significantly reduces our land (conventional ground forces) commitments and emphasizes special operations forces and airpower. In terms of major acquisition programs, I would initiate a sweeping program review to weed out costly programs which are not required to achieve our military and defense policy objectives. Each military service has pet programs which continue to exist more because they embody the service culture (read U.S. Air Force and the F-22) than actual military requirements. Weapons acquisition must be driven by military requirements, not service cultures or Capitol Hill politics.

Defense is one of the few legitimate responsibilities of the federal government. There are many other programs, which are well beyond the scope of the government’s responsibilities, which should be eliminated all together to address our dire fiscal situation. Conservatives need to realize, however, that there is nothing unconservative about reasoned and rational cuts to the defense budget. The fact remains that there is waste in the Pentagon and part of that waste stems from an overly costly grand strategy, one that is disconnected from America’s core national interests. Republicans in Congress must think very carefully about this nation’s involvement in foreign affairs and whether our current strategy is appropriate. The Tea Party movement should take this opportunity to extend its limited government message to U.S. foreign policy. Without pressure from the Tea Party movement, many Republicans will shrink from this challenge.

A Conservative Foreign Policy for America

Tom Skypek — Sat, 29 Jan 2011 13:58:11 +0000

Right now the biggest threat to the United States is its $14 trillion national debt. Throughout history great powers have bankrupted themselves by trying to do too much both at home and abroad, and unfortunately Washington is charging hard down that same fateful path. What is even more troubling is that when it comes to foreign policy, both major parties tend to advocate big government internationalism. The irony here is that many self-proclaimed conservatives advocate big government internationalism while championing limited government at home.

Yesterday, I outlined a new approach for American foreign policy in The Washington Examiner. It advocates redefining our national interest and reducing our military commitments abroad. Here’s an excerpt:

When it comes to foreign policy, it can be difficult these days to distinguish between Democrats and Republicans. Both parties are advocates of big government internationalism. Their differences on a range of issues—from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to Iran and North Korea—are more stylistic than substantive. And when it comes to the big strategic questions (e.g., For what purpose does the U.S. engage in foreign affairs?) the major parties are in lockstep. Both subscribe to a Wilsonian, liberal international agenda of democracy promotion and nation building with little regard for cost—or the Constitution.

A reformulation of American foreign policy is long overdue and the Tea Party movement is in a unique position to expand the ongoing national debate on federal spending into Washington’s costly and overly ambitious grand strategy…

…Since the end of the Cold War, American statesmen have defined the national interest in far too broad of terms, squandering taxpayer dollars in support of a foreign policy that does not clearly advance America’s core national interests. In FY 2008, Washington provided foreign aid to about 154 countries. Today, the U.S. military has a presence in about 150 countries. The majority of these aid packages and military deployments do little to promote America’s national interests; still, this type of big government internationalism has become unquestioned convention for the Washington foreign policy establishment and conservatives are as guilty as their liberal counterparts in pushing the global welfare state.

Many Republican and Democratic policymakers conflate American diplomatic, economic, and military primacy with omnipotence. As a result, they have consistently failed to reconcile America’s desired end states with its available means—eschewing important economic realities such as the $14 trillion national debt while failing to make the difficult tradeoffs often required of effective statesmen. In order to avoid the fate of previous great powers, the United States should adopt an economically sustainable grand strategy that advances a set of more narrowly defined national interests, encourages burden-sharing among its allies, and is consistent with the Constitution. More specifically, Washington should reduce its global footprint, keep its military power in abeyance, and discharge that power only in defense of the national interest.

The sole aim of Washington’s international engagement should be the preservation of American political and economic liberty—not to remake the world in its image. In his book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, former U.S. Senator Robert Taft argued, “I do not believe it is a selfish goal for us to insist that the overriding purpose of all American foreign policy should be the maintenance of the liberty and peace of our people of the United States…”

Any reformulation of American foreign policy must begin by redefining the national interest. Three pillars should comprise America’s national interest: (1) the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States, (2) the safety, security, and liberty of United States citizens, and (3) the ability to conduct trade and engage in commerce.

Detractors are quick to label any reappraisal of American foreign policy which calls for reduced commitments as isolationist or alarmist; invoking Neville Chamberlain and the appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s is a favorite tactic. But this is approach is anything but isolationist. It advocates free trade, a more targeted set of alliances, and a manageable number of deployments. In fact, Washington should continue to maintain its unparalleled advantage in military power, which can certainly be done at much less than $500 billion a year.

American military power will remain the ultimate guarantor of U.S. national security and will remain the most important instrument of grand strategy. Diplomatic and economic credibility require a military force that can defend its trade routes, keep its commitments, and make good on its threats. The use of force—war—is costly both in human and economic terms and should be used only in direct defense of America’s core national interests—not for the purposes of nation-building, peacekeeping or democracy promotion.

The 2012 Republican candidates need to take a serious look at their foreign policy positions and ask themselves whether their views are rooted in conservative thought or are simply Democratic-lite policy positions. It’s difficult to articulate a new foreign policy for America in 750 words, but what I’ve attempted to do is outline the broad concept for a more focused and strategically sound foreign policy. There’s nothing wrong with an “America first” foreign policy. We don’t cede our military or political power; we simply use it more judiciously. Much of our problem is poor management–a failure to reconcile ends and means. We’re the most power nation in the world, but at the end of the day we still have finite means with which to achieve our goals. That’s why we need to reexamine our national interest and make sure our goals are in proper alignment with the Constitution.

Mattis is a Great Pick to be CENTCOM Commander

Tom Skypek — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 18:23:27 +0000

U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, who currently serves as the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, has been selected to lead U.S. Central Command. This is an outstanding pick by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Mattis is an exemplary general officer and a true strategic thinker. Not surprisingly, the mainstream media is beating up on Mattis for some comments he’s made in the past about warfare. His remarks were candid and, unfortunately, have been taken out of context. One misleading headline reads: “James Mattis: ‘It’s fun to shoot some people.’” Here’s the context for the quote:

You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years, because they didn’t wear a veil. You know guys like that ain’t got no manhood left anyway. So it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot ‘em.

I know this might come as a surprise to some people but our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan are not good people. They intentionally target and kill civilians. They are the types who think it’s okay to slaughter innocent men, women, and children. They hold the nineteen hijackers who killed nearly three-thousand Americans on September 11, 2001 in high esteem. They treat women as second-class citizens and view it as their duty to kill Christians and Jews.

So Mattis isn’t politically correct; he’s a warrior and he’s exactly the type of man I want defending this country. It’s a blessing that we have men like James Mattis and it’s a travesty that his reputation be marred in anyway by a handful of so-called journalists. The Senate should waste no time in confirming General Mattis.

Steele’s Failed Critique Highlights Division Among Conservatives on War Strategy

Tom Skypek — Mon, 05 Jul 2010 14:18:38 +0000

In 2006, I was really pulling for Michael Steele in his battle to win a U.S. Senate seat in Maryland. Unfortunately, Ben Cardin won and Steele wound up running the Republican National Committee. Steele’s odd remarks about the war in Afghanistan have led to a growing number of calls for his resignation among prominent conservatives. The war in Afghanistan was definitely not a war of President Barack Obama’s choosing, as Steele suggested in his remarks at a Connecticut fundraiser. This factual inaccuracy made the rest of Steele’s comments seem off-the-wall, but it appears as though he was trying to challenge the president’s strategy for prosecuting the war. He just failed miserably:

Well if he’s such a student of history, has he not understood that, you know, that’s the one thing you don’t do is engage in a land war in Afghanistan. Alright? Because everyone who has tried over a thousand years of history has failed. And there are reasons for that. There are other ways to engage in Afghanistan without committing more troops.

To an extent, Steele is right: historically, Afghanistan is where great powers go to die. Some conservatives view the current strategy for the war in Afghanistan as fundamentally flawed–myself included. Our political objectives in Afghanistan are unclear and it is unlikely that we have the long-term political will to stay in Afghanistan for the time that’s required, nor the will to allocate the requisite number of troops. George Will wrote a great op-ed last year in which he argued that airpower, rather than land power, may be sufficient to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. Steele, however, failed to present clearly a viable alternative to a land-based, counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy for Afghanistan. His hollow critique lacked credibility because of his factually inaccurate statement about the genesis of the war. Conservatives are split on the issue of Afghanistan and the Steele flap highlights this division. At face value, the conservative uproar is focused on Steele’s bogus suggestion that America elected to fight this war, unprompted. The real issue is the division on strategy among conservatives. Because Steele did such a poor job of communicating this alternative viewpoint, this division remains largely unexplored.

Very simply, the RNC needs a chairman who can raise lots of money and who can present clear, and viable policy alternatives to the current administration. The RNC chairman doesn’t need to be a foreign policy expert, but he/she needs to present his/her ideas in a clear and unambiguous manner. Steele has been unable to do this on several occasions.

What I care about most are the November elections. Right now, conservatives are tracking to make impressive gains in the House and Senate. The Democrats in Congress and the Obama administration are imploding politically. Their liberal ideology is simply incompatible with an electorate that is, at the end of the day, center-right. So while Steele is an imperfect chairman, selecting at a new high-profile chairman at this time could become an unnecessary distraction from November. Every minute spent on Michael Steele is less time that’s spent thinking about how to win in November. Steele’s definitely no Lee Atwater or Haley Barbour, but I don’t have any better suggestions at the moment. Mitt Romney is an outstanding administrator and would do well, but the legacy of his government health care program in Massachusetts would render his opposition to nationalized medicine impotent. Plus, he would probably view the gig as a demotion–going from serious presidential candidate to party chairman. Or maybe he wouldn’t. Part of me thinks that Romney could be a powerhouse at the helm of the RNC. I’m just not sure how he would be able to handle the health care issue. This is the same issue that could potential hobble his 2012 ambitions.

Karzai’s Ingratitude

Tom Skypek — Sat, 20 Feb 2010 23:02:01 +0000

From the AP:

President Hamid Karzai urged NATO to do more to protect civilians during combat operations to secure Marjah, a southern Taliban stronghold and scene of the biggest allied ground assault of the eight-year war.

NATO forces have repeatedly said they want to prevent civilian casualties but acknowledged that it is not always possible. On Saturday, the alliance said its troops killed another civilian in the Marjah area, bringing the civilian death toll from the operation to at least 16.

Addressing the opening session of the Afghan parliament in Kabul, Karzai held up a picture of an 8-year-old girl who lost 12 relatives in a NATO rocket attack during the second day of the Marjah assault, which began Feb. 13.

This type of ingratitude from Karzai is unacceptable. 979 Americans have died fighting in Afghanistan since 2001. Obviously, NATO forces are working to limit civilian casualties. Karzai, who is essentially a corrupt thug himself, should be happy the Taliban isn’t still ruling his country. Why don’t his countrymen step up to the plate and fight these bastards? The only reason the United States is there in the first place is because his backwards nation ran itself into the ground. They let Islamist pigs, known as the Taliban, take over and the Taliban let Usama bin Laden and Co. set up shop.

NATO is trying to secure his country so that the Afghan people can enjoy liberty but they refuse to fight for themselves. President Obama should remind Mr. Karzai that the only reason he still has a head is because of American security. Remember, Islamists are the civilized folk who cut the heads of off those with whom they disagree.

How the Obama administration’s lack of credibility is weakening U.S. national security

Tom Skypek — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 12:28:32 +0000

Since January 20, 2009, American credibility has taken a back seat to the Obama administration’s quest for international popularity. During his trips to the Middle East and Asia last year, President Obama seemed more interested in bolstering his approval ratings abroad than advancing American interests. Last week it was reported that the Obama administration downgraded the priority placed on intelligence collection for China in an effort to increase cooperation with Beijing. This move was made despite the fact that Chinese cyberattacks against the U.S. are on the rise and the leadership in Beijing remains reticent about its massive military modernization program.

Unfortunately, U.S. national security is more dependent on the credibility of American power—and the words and policies of its commander-in-chief—than international popularity. In foreign affairs, credibility matters. Hollow threats and naïve policies embolden our adversaries while broken commitments lead our friends and allies to question our resolve. During the first year in power, the Obama administration has damaged American credibility with its mishandling of American national security policy.

Ft. Hood Terrorist Attack and Northwest Flight 253. The President’s sluggish response to both incidents was unfortunate, but what was far worse was his failure to identify both attacks for what they were—part of an international campaign by Islamic extremists to kill Americans. After Army Major Nadal Hassan murdered 13 soldiers at Ft. Hood last November, President Obama cautioned against a rush to judgment—despite immediate and overwhelming evidence that Hassan was indeed a jihadist. Obama would later refer to the Nigerian man who attempted to blow up Northwest Flight 253 on Christmas Day as “an isolated extremist.” This message of obfuscation is not one of strength and only serves to weaken American credibility. If we’re too timid to identify our adversaries, then how can we effectively prosecute a war against them?

The Afghanistan Decision. It took President Obama three months to make a decision on whether or not to increase troop levels in Afghanistan after his commanding general in Afghanistan (whom he selected) appealed to him for additional troops or risk a mission failure. Obviously, it is incumbent upon a commander-in-chief to carefully weigh all of his options when the use of force and American lives are at stake. But dawdling for three months after the commanding general has communicated, in no uncertain terms, that a failure to provide additional troops may jeopardize the mission is unacceptable. Such dithering only serves to paint the picture of an indecisive commander-in-chief. Indecision hampers American credibility.

Nuclear Weapons and a START Follow-On. The dramatic reduction of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and the movement toward a nuclear-free world quickly became one of President Obama’s signature foreign policy issues. In a speech in April 2009, he pledged to reduce significantly the U.S. nuclear stockpile as a first step toward a nuclear-free world. The problem is that his lofty policy ideas are simply incompatible with the U.S.’s need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. While the United States nuclear weapons complex is deteriorating in every respect, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are investing heavily in their own nuclear weapons complexes. Without credibility, deterrence will fail.

Missile Defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. Warsaw and Prague learned the hard way that under the Obama administration sometimes adversaries are treated better than allies. President Obama’s decision to scrap a missile defense agreement negotiated by his predecessor with the Polish and the Czech governments was yet another credibility-busting policy maneuver. Both Poland and the Czech Republic bent over backwards to support Washington; both countries wanted the European missile defense sites to defend against Iranian ballistic missiles. The message to U.S. allies: Don’t count on the United States to keep its word.

The Iranian Nuclear Program. President Barack Obama’s December 31^st deadline for Iran to accept the terms of the UN-crafted deal over its nuclear program has come and gone, without any real consequences for the regime in Tehran. After Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly mocked the year-end deadline, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs warned on December 22^nd that Washington’s ultimatum was “a very real deadline.” This latest deadline should not be confused with the very similar deadline President Obama set in July of last year that called for Iran to show “good faith” efforts toward disarmament by September 2009. The Iranians have faced no substantive consequences for failing to comply with these deadlines. The real consequence of these hollow threats? A deterioration of American credibility.

Closing Gitmo and the Prosecution of CIA Operatives. Days after taking office, President Obama made clear his commitment to close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. In August 2009, President Obama tasked Attorney General Eric Holder with investigating CIA operatives who used enhanced interrogation techniques during the Bush administration. Of course, both policy reversals were meant to assuage international opinion about perceived American “excesses” in the fight against Islamic extremism under the administration of George W. Bush. The message to the rest of the world: this is not the Bush administration. While this message might have pleased the Davos crowd and certain constituencies within the United States, this made clear that the Obama administration viewed the struggle against Islamic extremism much differently than its predecessor.

Trying Terrorists in Civilian Courts. The administration’s decision to try terrorists in civilian courts may placate the American Civil Liberties Union but at a tremendous cost to U.S. national security. As Charles Krauthammer recently noted, individuals who do not wear the uniform of a nation-state and launch direct attacks on civilians are enemy combatants and should not be afforded the same rights as American citizens. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the prosecutions of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspirators created a false impression that the U.S. criminal justice system was the proper venue in which to deal with terrorists.[i]

These decisions, taken individually or together, have only served to weaken American credibility abroad—not to mention they’ve been wholly ineffective. Have these policies convinced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to abandon his nuclear weapons program, Osama bin Laden to renounce terrorism, or Russia and China to support a comprehensive sanctions package against Iran? Hollow threats and obfuscation embolden our enemies, weaken our bargaining positions and leave Washington with fewer policy options. What is more, a continued reduction in American credibility may lead our friends and allies to reassess their defense and security relationships with the United States. It’s not too late for a course-correction but unless the White House begins to place a greater commitment on building American credibility rather than tearing it down, President Obama runs the risk of becoming another Jimmy Carter.

[i]The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 72.

The Best and the Brightest v2.0

Tom Skypek — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 15:28:46 +0000

President John F. Kennedy and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 1962

David Halberstam’s 1972 book, The Best and the Brightest, chronicles the origins of the Vietnam War in the Kennedy administration and the conduct and escalation of the war during the Johnson administration. More specifically, it examines how Camelot’s “best and the brightest” got U.S. policy in Southeast Asia so wrong. After all, how could so many smart and capable individuals make such poor foreign policy decisions?

Haunted by the specter of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the perception that the Democrat’s were responsible for “losing China” to the communists in 1949, the Kennedy administration drew a line against communism in Southeast Asia. However, the policies of minimalist incrementalism that prevailed throughout the 1960s in the conduct of the war resulted in a strategic defeat for the United States.

Today, President Barack Obama must make what is most likely the toughest decision of his life in deciding how to proceed in Afghanistan. Will he fully fund the war effort and provide General Stanley McChrystal with the 40,000 additional troops he’s requested or will he withdraw all ground forces and opt for an offshore counter-terrorism strategy advocated by George Will? He’ll probably do neither. He’ll probably split the difference and provide a few more combat brigades, but not what his commander’s requesting. Unfortunately, this will be tantamount to placing a band-aid on a laceration.

As I’ve said in previous posts, you can conduct strategy reviews until you’re blue in the face but at some point, if you’re the commander in chief, you need to make a decision. This is not a new issue for the White House or the Obama team. Obama railed against John McCain and George W. Bush during the 2008 presidential campaign on the issue of Afghanistan.

In Vietnam, Washington’s policy of minimalist incrementalism failed. Today, that same policy is failing in Afghanistan. Either Afghanistan is vital to U.S. national security or it’s not. If it is, then the war effort should be fully resourced and not fought on the cheap. If Afghanistan is not vital to U.S. national security, then U.S. strategy could be revamped. Obama’s foreign policy team is filled with many capable and talented individuals such as General Jim Jones and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, but the Obama administration is running the risk of repeating the mistakes made by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

A middle-of-the-road approach is the most politically palatable option for the White House. Many Americans are tired of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and do not want to send more troops. On the other hand, many Americans would perceive a withdrawal as “cutting and running.” Neither course of action would be popular politically. Unfortunately, the most politically tenable option is arguably the worst policy choice when you consider its long-term prospects for achieving a satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan. Right now, the military is trying to fight a war with one hand tied behind its back.

Obama Hits Links for 24th Time, Still No Decision on Afghanistan

Tom Skypek — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 14:23:18 +0000

Hopefully President Obama also budgeted some of his time on Sunday to thinking about Afghanistan. President Obama went golfing for the 24th time since taking office yesterday. Former President George W. Bush was in office almost three years before reaching the same milestone. Maybe a little less golf and a little more decision-making is in order for the Commander in Chief. What’s the big story for the media? President Obama went golfing with his Domestic Policy Advisor, Melody Barnes. Glad to see the media has their priorities straight.

Ian Bremmer on Afghanistan, China’s Recovery

Tom Skypek — Sat, 24 Oct 2009 19:20:43 +0000

Some interesting points from Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group, on U.S. foreign policy and the global economy. A couple of key takeaways from the interview:

1. Bremmer thinks that Obama will indeed support some type of troop surge in Afghanistan. However, he notes that while a “consesus” approach might work in Washington it won’t work in Afghanistan.

2. China’s economic recovery has been impressive, recently posting third quarter GDP growth of 8.9%.