Last month, the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released its assessment detailing how well the U.S. Government has implemented the recommendations presented in its December 2008 report.  The Commission explains in the overview, “The assessment is not a good one, particularly in the area of biological threats.” What is more, the assessment concludes that unless significant actions are taken “it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.  That weapon is more likely to be biological than nuclear.”

The Commission’s January 2010 report card covers a lot of material in its eighteen pages.  What struck me the most were the three areas in which the Commission gave failing grades: 1) consequence management efforts related to a biological terrorist attack, 2) congressional oversight of the U.S. national security community, and 3) the national security workforce.  I was struck because not one of these three issues is new.  These issues have been documented in countless think tank reports, government-funded studies, and blue ribbon commissions, just like the one that issued this latest report.  The problem(s) have been identified–on several occasions.  The real question is:  will the government take the necessary actions to ensure that the risks in these three areas is reduced?