President John F. Kennedy and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 1962

David Halberstam’s 1972 book, The Best and the Brightest, chronicles the origins of the Vietnam War in the Kennedy administration and the conduct and escalation of the war during the Johnson administration.  More specifically, it examines how Camelot’s “best and the brightest” got U.S. policy in Southeast Asia so wrong.  After all, how could so many smart and capable individuals make such poor foreign policy decisions? 

Haunted by the specter of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the perception that the Democrat’s were responsible for “losing China” to the communists in 1949, the Kennedy administration drew a line against communism in Southeast Asia.  However, the policies of minimalist incrementalism that prevailed throughout the 1960s in the conduct of the war resulted in a strategic defeat for the United States.

Today, President Barack Obama must make what is most likely the toughest decision of his life in deciding how to proceed in Afghanistan.  Will he fully fund the war effort and provide General Stanley McChrystal with the 40,000 additional troops he’s requested or will he withdraw all ground forces and opt for an offshore counter-terrorism strategy advocated by George Will?  He’ll probably do neither.  He’ll probably split the difference and provide a few more combat brigades, but not what his commander’s requesting.  Unfortunately, this will be tantamount to placing a band-aid on a laceration.

As I’ve said in previous posts, you can conduct strategy reviews until you’re blue in the face but at some point, if you’re the commander in chief, you need to make a decision.  This is not a new issue for the White House or the Obama team.  Obama railed against John McCain and George W. Bush during the 2008 presidential campaign on the issue of Afghanistan.  

In Vietnam, Washington’s policy of minimalist incrementalism failed.  Today, that same policy is failing in Afghanistan.  Either Afghanistan is vital to U.S. national security or it’s not.  If it is, then the war effort should be fully resourced and not fought on the cheap.  If Afghanistan is not vital to U.S. national security, then U.S. strategy could be revamped.  Obama’s foreign policy team is filled with many capable and talented individuals such as General Jim Jones and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, but the Obama administration is running the risk of repeating the mistakes made by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.  

A middle-of-the-road approach is the most politically palatable option for the White House.  Many Americans are tired of the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan and do not want to send more troops.  On the other hand, many Americans would perceive a withdrawal as “cutting and running.”  Neither course of action would be popular politically.  Unfortunately, the most politically tenable option is arguably the worst policy choice when you consider its long-term prospects for achieving a satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan.  Right now, the military is trying to fight a war with one hand tied behind its back.