Brad Thayer and I were quoted recently in a piece on U.S.-Russian relations published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).  The EIU piece provides a solid overview of the arms control negotiations that will occur throughout this year between Washington and Moscow regarding the expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this December.  It certainly looks as though missile defense will be the wedge issue du jour for this upcoming round of negotiations.  As EIU reports, “Russian commentators insist that there will be no new START unless the US puts its plans for a missile shield on ice.”  It will be interesting to see how these negotiations unfold. 

President Obama is clearly receptive to a bargain–at least with respect to the missile defense site in Eastern Europe, as he intimated in his recent letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.  If Moscow helped Washington to stall Iran’s nuclear weapons program by enacting a targeted sanctions package, would the U.S. still need a missile defense site in Eastern Europe?  Theoretically, the primary requirement for a missile defense site in Europe is a nuclear-armed Iran with an expanded ballistic missile capability.  So in the absence of a nuclear-armed Iran, what threat is the missile defense site defending against?  I understand that this was a “test” of the new administration and I share the view that China’s senior political leadership was certainly in the loop on this.  Nikolas Gvosdev examined this issue in more detail last week.

Regrettably, it is unlikely that Russia will be able to separate itself from its financial interests long enough to fulfill its end of the bargain.  Think about it.  Right now, what’s more important to the Russian leadership–financial gains and economic growth or “good will” from Washington?  If you’re Medvedev, you’d probably choose the former.